KoutenDB v0.15.0

This release hardens KoutenDB’s network, authentication, and foreign-driver boundaries. It adds bounded aggregate framing, fail-safe connection recovery, and explicit handling for writes whose remote outcome is unknown.

Security And Transport

  • Bound aggregate cluster transactions, batch responses, ring-list payloads, retrieval payloads, and multi-frame client responses.
  • Reject authentication and galaxy header delimiters without echoing supplied credentials in validation errors.
  • Require TLS for authenticated non-loopback listeners by default. SECRET_KEY remains an additional authentication and frame-protection layer, not a TLS replacement.
  • Apply cumulative header and body read deadlines so slow-drip clients cannot retain the request loop indefinitely.
  • Close failed or malformed connections instead of reusing an uncertain frame boundary.

Write Safety

Reads and explicitly fenced or deduplicated internal control operations retain one bounded transport retry. Ordinary mutations are no longer replayed automatically after a lost response because the server may already have committed the write. Nim callers receive KoutenIndeterminateWriteError and can reconcile by application identity or a subsequent read before deciding whether to issue another mutation.

Cluster transactions are the deliberate exception: their stable transaction ID and exact-intent collision check make an identical commit replay safe. Fenced coordinator controls and deduplicated Universe events have the same explicit protocol guarantee.

Validation

The new wire security matrix covers:

  • exact and over-limit aggregate boundaries;
  • transaction rejection without partial commit;
  • truncated, trailing, malformed, and oversized frames;
  • lost write acknowledgements and bounded safe-request retries;
  • failed-authentication descriptor cleanup;
  • codec renegotiation after reconnect;
  • slow-drip request recovery;
  • C ABI credential and galaxy injection rejection.

The release candidate is accepted only after the Linux and macOS CI suites pass on the release commit. This is a focused transport and boundary review, not a claim that independent penetration testing or every deployment threat has been completed.

See the v0.15 Security Review, Threat Model, and Security Validation Matrix.